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Introduction
In recent years, scholars have increasingly turned to quantitative
research methods to understand the impact of transitional justice on
societies emerging from periods of violence and repression. The term
transitional justice (TJ) has been used to describe a range of tools that
countries use to address past (and increasingly contemporary) human
rights abuses. With some variation, observers often distinguish at
least seven different types of transitional justice mechanisms:
prosecutions, truth commissions, vetting procedures, reparations,
memorialization, traditional practices, and institutional reform. 1
Although some would dispute labeling them a TJ mechanism,
amnesties are another policy tool with clear societal implications. To
date, quantitative studies of TJ impact have focused primarily on
trials, truth commissions, and amnesties. These are the mechanisms
that are most frequently discussed in policy debates as to how to
build lasting peace in post-conflict societies. They often have a higher
profile and possess higher stakes for political elites. Arguably, these
TJ mechanisms also are the easiest to identify due to media attention
1 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Daniel Rothenberg. The Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict
Justice. (Chicago: The International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University,
2008).
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and the legal trail they leave behind. Hence, they are the most
amenable to constructing large datasets.
The growth in quantitative scholarship is a response to
dissatisfaction with much of the early qualitative transitional justice
literature. Several observers have noted the need for basing claims
about the impact of transitional justice on more solid empirical
foundations. 2 In the early qualitative literature, many judgments about
the value of TJ were based upon impressionistic conclusions and
anecdotal evidence. In other cases, authors made claims based upon
legal or moral arguments rather than empirical evidence. Moreover,
much of this early literature was written by TJ practitioners who had
an inherent interest in seeing a particular outcome to the research. 3
The quantitative research seeks to address these shortcomings by
assembling large datasets of TJ events that span space and time and
employing ostensibly more objective, methodologically rigorous
research designs.
Existing empirical quantitative research often treats TJ
mechanisms as independent variables and assesses their impact on
dependent variables such as human rights, democracy, and peace
duration. Much of this quantitative literature makes bold policy
recommendations. Yet, the first wave of research offers relatively
little clear guidance to governments and societies emerging from
periods of conflict and repression, intergovernmental organizations
and global civil society that frequently help devise TJ plans, or
Eric Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and
Impact,” International Studies Perspectives 8.1 (2007): 16-35; David Mendeloff,
“Deterrence, Norm Socialization, and the Empirical Reach of Kathryn Sikkink's
The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World
Politics,” Journal of Human Rights 11.2 (2012): 289-295; Hugo van der Merwe,
Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, eds., Assessing the Impact of Transitional
Justice (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009);
Oskar N.T. Thoms, James Ron, and Roland Paris, “State-Level Effects of
Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?” International Journal of Transitional Justice
4.3 (2010): 1-26.
3 Michael Ben-Josef Hirsch, Megan Mackenzie, and Mohamed Sesay, “Measuring
the Impacts of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Placing the Global ‘Success’
of TRCs in Local Perspective,” Cooperation and Conflict 47.3 (2012): 386-403.
2
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governments and private donors in the Global North that often fund
these initiatives. Part of the problem involves explaining statistical
findings to a constituency that may have little to no statistical
training. For those more statistically inclined, however,
methodological challenges are apparent. Quantifying key concepts
and devising statistical models that provide a fair assessment of
potential cause-effect relationships is difficult. This has led some
observers to conclude that even the most advanced quantitative
research leaves much to be desired. 4 Perhaps the greatest obstacle to
quantitative research having a greater impact on TJ policy discussions
is that, collectively, the policy advice is inconsistent if not downright
contradictory. What are policymakers and activists to make of this
messiness?
In this article, we critically review the first wave of this
emerging quantitative literature that examines the impact of TJ
mechanisms. We find divergence on several methodological issues
that help to explain the different conclusions reached by these
studies, including sampling strategies, model construction, and the
measurement of key variables. Furthermore, these studies have often
failed to provide compelling theoretical or empirical bases for a
causal relationship between TJ mechanisms and dependent variables
such as democracy and human rights. We suggest several ways in
which quantitative scholars could produce findings with broader
credibility. Although we support the use of quantitative methods to
understand the impact of TJ mechanisms, greater methodological
care is needed in supporting policy recommendations.
Reviewing the Findings of the “First Wave” Quantitative
Literature
In the past decade, there has been a rapid expansion in the amount of
transitional justice research that employs quantitative research
methods. Some research treats transitional justice as the dependent
Anna MacDonald, “From the Ground Up: What Does the Evidence Tell Us
about Local Experiences of Transitional Justice,” Transitional Justice Review 1.3
(2015): 72-121; Thoms et al, “State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice,” 1-26.

4
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variable, others as the independent variable. Within the latter
literature that explores the effects of TJ, one can roughly divide
research based on the unit of analysis. Some quantitative research
focuses on the individual level, examining data on the reaction to TJ
by victims or mass publics and how TJ processes have shaped
individual attitudes toward other groups, human rights, democracy,
and the like. 5 In this article, we concern ourselves with quantitative
research that examines the impact of TJ at the national, or societal,
level.
In our review, we focus on the first wave of the quantitative
TJ literature, which ended in roughly 2011. As we shall illustrate, this
research has looked at a variety of TJ mechanisms and examined their
impact on a range of societal dimensions. We focus on studies that
examine the effect of TJ on human rights, democracy, and peace
duration, the three most common dependent variables in the
quantitative literature. Furthermore, we consider only those studies
that have been published in peer-reviewed outlets or that have been
released for attribution by their authors. As such, our review
underrepresents the use of quantitative methods as we do not include
the many conference papers and doctoral dissertations that were
produced during this first wave. In short, we review the most
prominent early studies, most of which are the product of major
database initiatives. Collectively, this emerging body of research does
not provide decisive policy prescriptions. In fact, there is a lack of
consensus as to whether or not particular TJ policies generally
produce benefits for society. It is likely that the methodological
challenges partially responsible for this divergence also are part of the

David Backer, “Victims' Responses to Truth Commissions: Evidence from South
Africa” in M. Ndulo, ed., Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation: When the Wars End
(London: University College London, 2007); James Gibson, “The Contributions of
Truth to Reconciliation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50.3 (2006): 409-432; James L.
Gibson, “The Legacy of Apartheid: Racial Differences in the Legitimacy of
Democratic Institutions and Processes in the New South Africa,” Comparative
Political Studies 36.7 (2003): 772-800; James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can
Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004).

5
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reason why more of this research has yet to appear in peer-reviewed
outlets.
Surveying the Findings
Several studies have reached pessimistic conclusions regarding the
effects of particular types of TJ mechanisms. Wiebelhaus-Brahm, for
example, focuses specifically on truth commissions. 6 Building his
truth commission dataset from Hayner, the United States Institute of
Peace, and news reports, he explores their role in promoting human
rights and democracy. 7 Using a global sample of countries over the
years from 1980 to 2006, he finds that truth commissions have a
negative effect on human rights and no effect on democracy.
Wiebelhaus-Brahm utilizes a multi-method research design that seeks
to gain the best of quantitative and qualitative approaches.
Unfortunately, his case study findings are not entirely consistent with
his statistical results, leaving the reader to wonder whether his cases
are not representative of truth commissions in general or if there are
weaknesses in the statistical model.
Melander focuses on amnesties, which many see as an
obstacle to justice. 8 Specifically, he assesses whether amnesty
provisions in peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2005 make
peace more or less durable. He finds that amnesties reduce the risk of
renewed fighting in authoritarian regimes because, he argues, the
greater stability and insulation provided to autocrats make them more
immune to pressures to renege on the amnesty. By contrast,
amnesties do not have a pacifying effect in democracies or regimes in
transition. In either scenario, the results are not positive on
normative grounds: either justice is foregone or armed conflict
resumes.
6 Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on
Human Rights and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010).
7 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New
York: Routledge, 2001).
8 Erik Melander, “Justice or Peace? A Statistical Study of the Relationship between
Amnesties and Durable Peace,” JAD-PbP Working Paper No. 4: 2009.
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Meernik, Nichols, and King consider the effects of
prosecuting human rights violators before domestic and international
courts. 9 They focus on examining the effect of prosecution on
human rights practices and the durability of peace in countries that
emerged from civil war between 1982 and 2007. Their findings do
little to support the strong claims of either trial supporters or critics.
In fact, they conclude that countries that experience trials are no
more or less likely to experience a recurrence of intrastate conflict or
improvements in human rights practices compared to countries in
which prosecutions have not occurred. According to Meernik et al.,
trials do not risk renewed violence, but neither do they necessarily
cement peace or promote human rights.
Other research looks at a combination of TJ mechanisms.
Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, for instance, explore the consequences of
trials, truth commissions, and amnesties for subsequent human rights
practices and democratization processes in countries transitioning to
democracy between 1970 and 2004. 10 In examining the individual and
interactive effects of these three TJ policies, they reach interesting
conclusions. First, they find that trials or amnesties alone do not have
a statistically significant effect on improving human rights or
democracy. Second, in line with Wiebelhaus-Brahm, they find that
truth commissions on their own have a negative effect on human
rights. 11 Third, only when trials and amnesties are used together do
they have a positive effect on human rights and democracy. They
conclude that this approach is effective by balancing demands for
accountability with perpetrators’ needs for security. In those
situations where both trials and amnesties exist, they find that truth
commissions do not have a negative effect.

James D. Meernik, Angela Nichols, and Kimi L. King, “The Impact of
International Tribunals and Domestic Trials on Peace and Human Rights after
Civil War,” International Studies Perspectives, 11.3 (2010): 309-334.
10 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in
Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 2010).
11 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
9
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Of the quantitative studies we examine, Lie, Binningsbø, and
Gates offer the most expansive study in terms of TJ-related
mechanisms included. 12 They examine trials, purges, reparations to
victims, truth commissions, amnesties, and the use of exile. They
consider the effects of these mechanisms on the likelihood of conflict
recurrence in countries in which a civil war, as defined by UppsalaPRIO’s armed conflict dataset, ended between 1946 and 2003.
Overall, they conclude that TJ processes have a weak and
inconsistent effect on the durability of peace. Trials appear to be the
most important type of justice, though the effect of trials is sensitive
to the mode of conflict termination. The other interesting finding is
that amnesty reduces peace duration, but, as with trials, the effect of
this variable also is sensitive to conflict termination, indicating that
conflict termination clearly affects the prospect for justice as well as
post-conflict peace duration.
By contrast, other research finds that transitional justice has a
clearer positive benefit for societies emerging from conflict or
repression. Kim and Sikkink test the alleged deterrent effect of
prosecuting human rights violators. 13 In other words, can trials
promote human rights? They include a range of trial processes,
including those conducted by domestic courts; in foreign courts
under universal jurisdiction principles; and international courts, which
encompass the International Criminal Court, ad-hoc international
tribunals, and hybrid courts. They examine the effect of trials on
human rights with a sample of countries that have undergone a
transition from authoritarian rule, civil war, or state creation between
1974 and 2004. According to Kim and Sikkink, “the mechanisms
through which transitional justice measures influence human rights
do not only involve a calculation of the possibility of punishment, but
Tove Grete Lie, Helga Malmin Binningsbø and Scott Gates, “Post-Conflict
Justice and Sustainable Peace,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4191, PostConflict Transitions Working Paper No. 5: 2007.

12

Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of
Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,” International Studies
Quarterly 54.4 (2010): 939–963.

13
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also respond to processes that provide information and communicate
norms.” 14 By this line of reasoning, human rights trials and truth
commissions help to spread a norm of accountability that makes
human rights abuses socially atrocious; as a result, violations decline.
Building on this logic, they code a dichotomous variable for trial
activity in a given year. Their data source, US State Department
human rights reports, does not permit measuring the number of trials
that take place so they simply measure the presence or absence of
trial activity in a given year. Moreover, they do not distinguish
between whether the target of prosecution is a high-level official or
someone from the lower ranks. Although they devote relatively little
attention to them theoretically, the article also explores whether truth
commissions have a deterrent effect. Contrary to WiebelhausBrahm 15 and Olsen et al. 16, they find that both truth commissions and
human rights prosecutions have a positive impact on lessening
repression. Moreover, countries that have had more years of
prosecutions have better human rights practices than countries with
fewer.
Summing It Up
Collectively, the aforementioned research offers convoluted policy
prescriptions. In terms of amnesties, Lie et al. 17 and Melander 18 argue
they promote peace if implemented by authoritarian regimes; the
reverse is true for democratic countries. At the same time, according
to Olsen et al. 19, amnesties promote human rights and democracy,
though only if balanced with trials. With respect to trials, the answer
truly is that “it depends”. Kim and Sikkink 20 are optimistic about the
Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect,” 953-954; also see Kathryn
Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2011).
15 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
16 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
17 Lie et al, “Post-Conflict Justice.”
18 Melander, “Justice or Peace?”.
19 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
20 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect.”
14

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 97-133

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss5/4

8

Stewart and Wiebelhaus-Brahm: Quantitative Transitional Justice Research

105 Quantitative Transitional Justice Research

ability of trials to promote human rights, while Lie et al. and Meernik
et al. 21 suggest we should not hope for too much. Olsen et al. tell us
that democracy and human rights will advance furthest where trials
are balanced by amnesties. Finally, the truth commission conclusions
are the most obviously contradictory. While Kim and Sikkink argue
they promote human rights, Wiebelhaus-Brahm 22 and Olsen et al.
find the opposite.
Making Sense of the Divergent Findings
Several factors help to explain these divergent findings. We highlight
three major issues that are the result of using quantitative methods.
The first issue relates to definition and measurement of key concepts.
In particular, studies have defined transitional justice mechanisms in
different ways, resulting in a lack of consistency on what cases are
included. As we have seen, these studies also vary in what dependent
variable they use. While they may be concerned with different areas
of impact, more general conclusions about the utility of particular TJ
mechanisms may implicitly follow. Second, these studies have drawn
their samples in different ways. Some look at cases of democratic
transition, others post-civil war, or both. The time period covered
also varies considerably. As a result, the TJ and non-TJ cases in the
studies’ samples are not necessarily the same. In other words, the
cases upon which these causal claims are tested are not identical
across studies. Finally, scholars have constructed their statistical
models in different ways. It is important to explore whether the
models chosen are appropriate for testing causal claims and whether
they have done a reasonable job of addressing concerns such as
endogeneity and omitted variable bias.
Definitional and Measurement Issues
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS
In general, statistical research has treated transitional justice
mechanisms as dummy variables. In other words, they have been
21
22

Meernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
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coded as ones and zeroes to reflect the presence or absence of a TJ
mechanism. One can reasonably question whether it is appropriate to
treat all trials (or truth commissions, amnesties, etc.) as being the
same for theory testing. Trials certainly vary on many dimensions,
including how many trials occur; who is on trial; whether the process
is free and fair; and whether a conviction is reached. Truth
commissions vary in terms of the scope of the investigative task they
were given; the powers that were granted to compel cooperation; the
makeup of the commissioners; and whether they produce a final
report, to cite a few important differences. Among other things,
amnesties differ in terms of who is eligible; and whether recipients
are required to do anything as a precondition for receiving the
amnesty. As we shall see, several studies under review try to address
some of this diversity. Nonetheless, these steps are unlikely to satisfy
some qualitative scholars, particularly those who view each TJ
process as sui generis.
Within the quantitative literature, there are significant
differences in how trial processes are measured. Lie et al. 23, for
instance, do not provide explicit criteria for case selection. For Olsen,
et al. 24, a trial is coded only when a verdict is reached. They
hypothesize that outcome, rather than process, is critical for any
impact of trials on democracy and human rights. At the same time,
they include in their sample trials of a diversity of suspects, including
armed rebel groups; state agents fighting civil wars, conducting
counterinsurgency operations, or engaging in government repression;
and domestic political opposition groups (including those
participating in coup attempts). This is different from Kim and
Sikkink, who view process, rather than outcome, as important. They
code for indictments, arrests, extraditions, detentions and trials under
the umbrella category of human rights prosecutions. Moreover, Kim
and Sikkink’s 25 sample, unlike Olsen et al., is limited to government
agents accused of human rights violations. As long as the prosecution
Lie et al, “Post-Conflict Justice.”
Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance, 32.
25 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect,” 948.
23
24
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activity (as outlined in US State Department and Amnesty
International reports) inflicts a cost on a government agent accused of
human rights violations, it is coded. Their definition of cost includes
the financial costs of legislation, lost income during preventative
detention, as well as the loss of prestige and legitimacy that
accompanies trials. 26 One commonality between these studies is that
they lump domestic and international prosecutions into a single trial
variable. Meernik et al. 27 adopt Kim and Sikkink’s definition, but treat
domestic prosecution and international courts as separate variables.
Overall, Kim and Sikkink’s 28 sampling strategy leads to a
much smaller sample compared to Olsen et al. 29 As illustrated in
Appendix A, Olsen et al. have 81 countries with trials in their sample,
while Kim and Sikkink have only 48. While Kim and Sikkink’s
definition is much broader in regards to what court activity
constitutes prosecutorial activity because they determine their sample
using the cost-inflicted standard as opposed to the verdict-only
standard of Olsen et al., the latter include the trials of a broader range
of actors. These contrasting sampling strategies lead to a very
different sample base. In total, the Kim and Sikkink and the Olsen et
al. samples have only 36 trial countries in common. Moreover,
because of the different sampling strategies, the number of trial-years
included in both datasets is very different.
Determining which sampling strategy is most beneficial for
testing trials as an independent variable depends in part on theoretical
judgments about whether the impact of trials serves as a deterrent or
as a norm generator. Coding only verdicts presumes that trial activity
in and of itself does not have an impact on attitudes and behaviors.
As such, by coding for verdicts only, Olsen et al. 30 fail to include
several high-profile cases in which a verdict was not reached due to
the death of the defendant (Slobodan Milosevic and Augusto
Pinochet, for example). Kim and Sikkink argue that their approach
Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect,” 942.
Meernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”
28 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect.”
29 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
30 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
26
27
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indicates that trial activity deters future rights abuses through norm
diffusion. 31 Yet, it is difficult to determine if and to what extent trials
genuinely help promote norm diffusion. As Mendeloff argues, the
causal logic of normative-based arguments is problematic because it
assumes that the presence of human rights prosecutions (indictments,
arrests, trials, etc.) is a legitimate expression of the norm. 32 Human
rights trials may themselves be unjust depending on the manner in
which they are conducted. In terms of actors subject to trials, Kim
and Sikkink assume that human rights are promoted primarily
through the prosecution of state agents. It is unclear how these types
of trials would impact the behavior of non-state actors. By contrast,
Olsen et al.’s inclusion of coup plotters introduces a range of trial
processes not necessarily associated with TJ. More generally, neither
study adequately accounts for differences in the quality of trial
activity. However, these somewhat subjective judgments would be
difficult to make for a large number of cases.
It is particularly difficult to test normative explanations for
quantitative findings, because how can we know that repression is
reduced because of burgeoning human rights norms? While Kim and
Sikkink’s findings offer an important counter-weight to some of the
other TJ literature, the theoretical explanations for their empirical
findings are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to empirically test. 33
By contrast, Olsen et al. may underappreciate the influence of trial
processes. 34 Indeed, both the concepts of deterrence and norm
diffusion (as well as norm creation) are complex processes that call
for more research; because of this, definitional choices should be
firmly rooted in theory.
Several of the studies under review address the impact of
truth commissions. At least implicitly, they generally adopt Hayner’s
definition of truth commissions as “bodies set up to investigate a past
history of violations of human rights in a particular country – which
31
32
33
34

Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect.”
David Mendeloff, “Deterrence, Norm Socialization and the Empirical Reach.”
Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect.”
Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
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can include violations by the military or other government forces or
armed opposition forces.” 35 Elsewhere, Hayner elaborates on this
basic definition to emphasize that truth commissions are temporary
bodies officially sanctioned by the state to examine a pattern of
human rights abuses over a broad period of time. 36 However,
definitional challenges plague the comparative study of truth
commissions. Given ambiguity in the meaning of key attributes like
official sanction, whether the commissions need to be newly
established, and what constitutes a pattern of abuse and a broad
period of time, studies contain very different lists of truth
commission cases. Brahm’s survey of cross-national studies found
vastly different lists of truth commission cases (see Appendix B for a
comparison of cases in select studies). 37
The studies under review vary significantly in how they treat
truth commissions. Kim and Sikkink include truth commissions, but
do not define or explain their criteria for including cases. 38 Lie et al.
do not even provide a list of cases. 39 Olsen et al. use Hayner’s
definition of truth commissions; they define a truth commission as a
“newly established, temporary body officially sanctioned by a state or
an international governmental organization to investigate past human
rights abuses.” 40 As is evidenced by Appendix B, however, Olsen et
al. include many cases as truth commissions that other studies,
including Hayner’s, do not. Olsen et al. have 68 truth commissions in
their data, whereas Wiebelhaus-Brahm, for example, has 28 in his
models. 41 While not necessarily evidence they are wrong to do so,
Olson et al. code for several truth commissions that others appear to
have judged as different types of mechanisms. Some, such as Brazil’s
Priscilla B. Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative
Study,” Human Rights Quarterly 16.4 (1994): 597-655.
36 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 14.
37 Eric Brahm, “What is a Truth Commission and Why Does it Matter?” Peace and
Conflict Review 3.2 (2009): 1-14.
38 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect.”
39 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.”
40 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 34.
41 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
35

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 97-133

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2017

13

Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 4

Brandon Stewart and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm 110

1995-2007 commission, did not appear to have undertaken significant
investigations of abuses; rather, it processed claims by victims. 42
Furthermore, Hayner’s definition includes the stipulation that the
truth commission “investigate a pattern of abuses over a period of
time, rather than a specific event.” 43 Olsen et al. do not always
follow their sampling criterion, as they code for some commissions
that examine specific events rather than a pattern of abuses. 44 For
instance, they include the Investigating Commission on the
Kidnapping and Assassination of National Representatives Zelmar
Michelini and Hector Gutierrez Ruiz in Uruguay. We are not
suggesting that more narrowly-construed investigations cannot
influence such things as human rights and democracy. However,
there has yet to be a systematic study of different types of
investigative commissions that explores whether the type of
investigation matters for different outcomes.
Although in a fairly limited way, some of the studies attempt
to account for qualitative differences in truth commissions. Olsen et
al., for example, include any truth commission that begins its work. 45
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, by contrast, adds the stipulation that the
commission must make recommendations to redress past abuses and
to prevent such abuses from occurring again in the future. 46 In one
model, he examines the effect of a commission’s operation by only
coding those years in which the commission existed. He also
measures the years following the publication of a truth commission’s
final report to gauge longer term effects. Finally, in order to get at
another qualitative difference, on the assumption that final reports
are critical for their impact, he includes only cases where reports were

42 G. Mezarobba, “Between Reparations, Half Truths and Impunity: The Difficult
Break with the Legacy of the Dictatorship in Brazil,” Sur: International Journal on
Human Rights 7.13 (2010): 7-26.
43 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 14.
44 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
45 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
46 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
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publicly released. He finds that the impact of truth commissions is
magnified if the final report is made available. 47
Furthermore, the studies that examine amnesties also fail to
make strong qualitative distinctions. Lie et al. 48 and Olsen et al. 49 treat
amnesties as dummy variables. Melander only considers amnesty
provisions that are part of formal peace agreements. 50 Otherwise, he
also does not make qualitative distinctions among amnesties. Yet, we
know that there is tremendous diversity among amnesties. 51
Finally, Lie et al. 52 and Olsen et al. 53 experiment with
aggregating TJ experiences into one variable. For example, aside from
treating the TJ mechanisms in their model separately, Lie et al. also
create an additive index to distinguish where between 0 and 4
mechanisms were used. In other words, a country in which trials,
purges, a truth commission, and reparations have been conducted
would be scored a 4, whereas a country that experienced trials and
purges and another country that experienced a truth commission and
reparations would each be coded a 2. Theoretically, it is difficult to
make a compelling argument that these latter two TJ configurations
are identical. By contrast, Olsen et al. construct an ordered variable to
measure the extent to which accountability has been achieved. To do
this, countries are scored to reflect how far along an accountability
continuum they have moved, where amnesty=1, truth
commission=2, and trial=3. While arguably useful if accountability is
the most desirable dimension of TJ, other criteria might lead us to
rank mechanisms differently. Moreover, measuring in this way
prevents us from examining how the timing and sequencing of these
mechanisms may shape outcomes. In general, aggregating TJ
measures does not seem to be a very promising avenue as it requires
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies, 139, 159.
Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.”
49 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
50 Melander, “Justice or Peace?”
51 Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace
and Justice Divide (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2008).
52 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.”
53 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
47
48
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making questionable assumptions about ranking and aggregation and
generally obscures valuable qualitative information.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Comparatively speaking, there is greater consensus on the measures
used to judge the impact of transitional justice. Kim and Sikkink 54,
Wiebelhaus-Brahm 55, and Olsen et al. 56, for example, all use
Cingranelli and Richards’ (CIRI) measure of human rights, which is
focused on physical integrity rights. Wiebelhaus-Brahm and Olsen et
al. also use the Political Terror Scale (PTS) as a robustness check.
Both CIRI and PTS provide countries’ human rights scores based
upon annual human rights reports produced by the US State
Department and Amnesty International. CIRI provides a yearly
evaluation of countries’ protection of a range of different human
rights, namely the rights to freedom from extra-judicial killing,
disappearance, torture, and political imprisonment. In addition, the
dataset contains an index of these items that measures the general
protection of physical integrity rights. 57 By contrast, the PTS provides
a five-point measure of the degree to which physical integrity rights
are protected by the government. 58 The PTS reports two human
rights scores, corresponding to each of the annual human rights
reports used as a reference. The PTS has been criticized for

Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect.”
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
56 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
57 In each of these four areas, a country’s behavior is coded as follows: 0 = practice
reported 50 or more times in the year; 1 = practice reported between 1 and 49
times in the year; and 2 = practice not reported in the year. To construct the
physical integrity rights score, Mokken Scaling Analysis is used, resulting in a
measure that varies between 0 and 8. For more on CIRI’s coding, see David L.
Cingranelli and David L.Richards, The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset
Version 2008.03.12, Available: http://www.humanrightsdata.org [Accessed April 25
2009].
58 Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale 1976-2007,
Available at http://www.politicalterrorscale.org (Accessed April 25 2009)
54
55
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attempting to force into one measure a multidimensional concept. 59
Moreover, the scores are based on qualitative judgments of the
prevalence of state-sanctioned violence rather than on a strict count
as CIRI uses. Theoretically, both measures are useful in measuring
potential deterrent effects. They are less effective, however, in
judging the impact of TJ on attitudes toward human rights that fall
short of observable behavior. Moreover, both measures rely on
organizations that may be biased in their reporting. 60
Wiebelhaus-Brahm and Olsen et al. 61 also are interested in the
effect on democratization. Wiebelhaus-Brahm focuses on Freedom
House’s Civil Liberties measure, which he argues best measures the
aspects of democracy that truth commissions are most likely to
influence. 62 Olsen et al., by contrast, provide little explicit reflection
on measurement choices and whether they reasonably measure
effects of TJ. Rather, they take an inclusive approach and include
Polity’s measure 63 as well as Freedom House’s Civil Liberties and

James M. McCormick and Neil J. Mitchell, “Human Rights Violations, Umbrella
Concepts, and Empirical Analysis,” World Politics 49.4 (1997): 510-525; David L.
Cingranelli and David L. Richards, “Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of
Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights,” International Studies Quarterly
43.2 (1999): 407-417.
60 For a review of some of the issues with quantitative human rights measures, see
Todd Landman, “Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice and Policy,” Human
Rights Quarterly 26.4 (2009): 906-931.; Steven C. Poe, Sabine C. Carey and Tanya C.
Vazquez, “How are These Pictures Different? A Quantitative Comparison of the
US State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports, 19761995,” Human Rights Quarterly 23.3 (2001): 650-677.; Reed M. Wood and Mark
Gibney, “The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to
CIRI,” Human Rights Quarterly 32.2 (2010): 367-400.”
61 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
62 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies, 25.
63 Polity IV bases its democracy measure on: Executive Recruitment (3.1 XRREG
Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment; 3.2 XRCOMP Competitiveness of
Executive Recruitment; 3.3 XROPEN Openness of Executive Recruitment); The
Independence of Executive Authority (3.4 XCONST Executive Constraints
(Decision Rules)); and Political Competition and Opposition (3.5 PARREG
Regulation of Participation; 3.6 PARCOMP The Competitiveness of Participation).
59
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Political Rights scores. 64 In reality, the causal links between any form
of TJ and the aspects of democracy measured by these datasets are
likely to involve one or more intervening variables. Theoretically,
therefore, making causal arguments regarding TJ impact on these
aspects of democracy is problematic. However, other aspects that
might be more relevant, such as public attitudes about perpetrators,
the extent to which voters cross group boundaries, or attitudes
toward members of other groups in society are not widely available,
at least not in a form amenable to cross-national research.
Freedom House “ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights
questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are grouped
into three subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and
Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). The civil liberties questions
are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4
questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Scores are awarded to each of these
questions on a scale of 0 to 4, where a score of 0 represents the smallest degree and
4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties present. The political rights section also
contains two additional discretionary questions: question A (For traditional
monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for
genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public discussion of
policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?) and question B (Is the
government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a
country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of
another group?). For additional discretionary question A, a score of 1 to 4 may be
added, as applicable, while for discretionary question B, a score of 1 to 4 may be
subtracted (the worse the situation, the more that may be subtracted). The highest
score that can be awarded to the political rights checklist is 40 (or a total score of 4
for each of the 10 questions). The highest score that can be awarded to the civil
liberties checklist is 60 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 15 questions). The
scores from the previous survey edition are used as a benchmark for the current
year under review. In general, a score is changed only if there has been a real world
development during the year that warrants a change (e.g., a crackdown on the
media, the country’s first free and fair elections) and is reflected accordingly in the
narrative. In answering both the political rights and civil liberties questions,
Freedom House does not equate constitutional or other legal guarantees of rights
with the on-the-ground fulfillment of these rights. While both laws and actual
practices are factored into the ratings decisions, greater emphasis is placed on the
latter.” (from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world2012/methodology).

64
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Finally, both Lie et al. 65 and Melander 66 use Uppsala-PRIO
data to measure the length of the post-conflict peace period. This
dataset marks the presence of violent conflict when fighting crosses a
25 battle-related death threshold. Using a 25 battle-death threshold is
an advance over traditional ways of measuring wars as 1,000 battlerelated deaths. However, this criterion overlooks other types of
violence, such as acts of government repression, acts of terrorism,
domestic violence, or criminal violence that may be evidence of TJ
impact (or lack thereof).
Sampling strategies
Consumers of this emerging quantitative research would be wellserved by paying careful attention to how these scholars craft their
sample because it has clear implications for the scope of their
findings. Chronological coverage is limited by data availability for the
dependent variable. As a result, studies that assess the impact on
human rights or democracy are generally limited to focusing only on
the period since the 1970s. Conflict data are not so limited.
Furthermore, scholars vary as to whether they seek to contribute to
discussions about states transitioning to democracy, post-conflict
societies, or both. Wiebelhaus-Brahm tries to avoid selection effects
by using a global sample that includes countries that did not
experience civil conflict or an attempted transition from authoritarian
rule to democracy. 67 By doing so, however, he includes many
extraneous cases and potentially dilutes his findings.
Given their focus on whether TJ increases the risk of conflict
resumption, Lie et al. 68 and Melander 69 rightly focus only on postconflict countries. Both further limit their sample. Melander, for
example, looks only at the durability of peace following formal peace
agreements. As a result, his findings should be read with this more
limited applicability in mind. In addition, both he and Lie et al.
Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.”
Melander, “Justice or Peace?”
67 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
68 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.”
69 Melander, “Justice or Peace?”
65
66
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require at least two years of non-violence between conflict years
before the country would enter the sample. While not unreasonable,
the choice reduces the study’s ability to say something about the
dynamics in the immediate aftermath of conflict termination. While
Lie et al. use Uppsala/PRIO data to determine their sample of postconflict societies, it is possible that their number of post-conflict
societies is inflated because the Uppsala/PRIO data has conflict
dyads of governments and an armed opposition group as its unit of
analysis. This means that if a government is at war with several
different factions, each of these conflicts may be coded as a separate
conflict dyad. Given the fact that they do not report their data, it is
difficult to ascertain how this issue is addressed. Meernik et al., by
contrast, do not suffer from the problem of multiple dyads, as they
measure the presence or absence of internal war in a given state in a
given year. 70
Another illustration of the significance of sampling can be
seen by comparing the findings of Meernik et al. 71 and Kim and
Sikkink. Although they define human rights trials according to the
same parameters, Meernik et al.’s results are not as optimistic. Rather,
they find that domestic human rights trials and international tribunals
after civil war have had no effect on subsequent human rights
practices. How do we explain the contrasting findings of Meernik et
al. and Kim and Sikkink, when both use the same definition for
human rights trials? For one, the sampling strategies for transitional
societies are different. Kim and Sikkink 72 consider countries going
through three types of transitions: from autocracy to democracy,
from war to peace, and transition by state creation. Meernik et al., by
contrast, focus exclusively on post-civil war trials. Even beyond that,
there is a major difference in the number of post-civil war states in
the two studies’ samples. Kim and Sikkink determine their sample by
using the Polity IV data set; they code 16 states as transitioning from
civil war. Meernik et al., using Uppsala/PRIO, find a total of 82 postMeernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”
Meernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”
72 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect,” 178.
70
71

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 97-133

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss5/4

20

Stewart and Wiebelhaus-Brahm: Quantitative Transitional Justice Research

117 Quantitative Transitional Justice Research

civil war states. The much higher number of post-civil war states in
Meernik et al. is due to the fact that Uppsala/PRIO’s definition is
one in which there are at least 25 battle deaths in a dyadic conflict in
which at least one actor is a state actor. As a result of using what this
dataset defines as a civil war, several states that had very short
periods of civil war (e.g., Kenya, 20 days; Moldova, 7 months;
Lesotho, 2 ½ months) are included in their sample of post-civil war
states (see Appendix C for comparative post-civil war data).
The much smaller number of post-civil war transitions in the
Kim and Sikkink 73 data can be addressed in part because some of the
states that they code as having a transition by state creation
(Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Macedonia, Croatia, Moldova, etc.) also had civil
wars after the new state emerged. While Kim and Sikkink code
Bosnia in both the transition from civil war (1995-) and transition of
state creation (1992-) categories, many other states that had a civil
war after state creation are not included in the transition from civil
war category.
In addition, as Meernik et al.’s data from
Uppsala/PRIO illustrates, many of these civil conflicts were small in
scope. Finally, some states in the Kim and Sikkink data (such as
Azerbaijan in 1992, Guatemala in 1984) are coded as having
democratic transitions while they were in the middle of civil wars,
according to the data from Uppsala/PRIO. In sum, scholars need to
be cautious in how they construct their samples to bolster the quality
of their inferences. Moreover, academics have to be wary of the nonlinear relationship between processes of democratization and civil
conflict.
Statistical modeling
Finally, the studies under review employ a variety of statistical
techniques. These methodological choices are made to strengthen the
robustness and validity of statistical findings. Yet, these choices have
implications for how effectively the model can account for real-world
causal processes. Methodological choices also have implications as to

73
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the studies’ unit of analysis. As we shall see, these questions have
been dealt with in a variety of ways.
Arguably, Olsen et al. provide the simplest model. 74 They take
the political transition as their unit of analysis (91 transitions in total)
and compare human rights and democracy scores at the transition
with five and ten years after. However, they fail to account for when
TJ is implemented in that five or ten year period. Essentially,
therefore, regardless of when it is implemented, TJ gets ‘credit’ for
the five or ten year change in human rights or democracy as if TJ had
been implemented right at the transition. Taking five or ten year
snapshots can mask significant fluctuations, which are lost in this
framework. In their model, Olsen et al. include controls such as
GDP per capita, time since transition, levels of democracy, and
regional dummies, but leave out others such as conflict involvement
that previous quantitative research on human rights and democracy
have found important. 75
Kim and Sikkink 76 and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 77, by contrast,
employ cross-national time-series techniques, using the country-year
as their unit of analysis. They are able to control for country-specific
factors that might be influencing results. Both studies also employ
two-stage estimation techniques that help researchers control for
endogeneity; in other words, the possibility that an alleged effect of
TJ was actually caused by an antecedent condition that produced TJ
and the outcome of interest. While arguably an improvement, these
models too are only as good as the data behind them. Several
variables that theoretically should be included as a control or in the
first stage equation, such as the nature of the political
Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
Steven Poe and C. Neal Tate, “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity
in the
1980s: A Global Analysis,” American Political Science Review 88.4 (1994):853-872;
Steven Poe, C. Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith, “Repression of the Human Right
to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years
1976-1993,” International Studies Quarterly 43.2 (1999): 291-313.
76 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect.”
77 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
74
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transition/balance of forces, are omitted due to a lack of crossnational data. Moreover, they do not control for the presence of
other TJ mechanisms.
Because they are interested in the propensity of states that
employ TJ to see a resumption of conflict, Lie et al. 78 employ an
events history model, namely a Cox Proportional Hazards Model.
Theoretically, this makes great sense as the technique allows the
researcher to examine whether the ‘treatment’, in this case TJ,
increases or decreases the probability of conflict recurrence. The unit
of analysis is the duration of the peace spell following a cessation of
conflict. It is superior to limited dependent variable techniques, like
logit and probit, which is used by Meernik et al. 79 and Melander 80,
because these latter approaches assume that each observation is
independent.
However, Lie et al.’s approach may artificially inflate the
number of cases in their sample, as they disaggregate their data into
‘peace years’, which starts the first day of peace after conflict and
ends December 31 the same year; the problem with their
methodology is that subjects enter the dataset again on the first day
of peace after the resumed conflict ends. They employ a duration
variable measuring the length of the post-conflict peace period,
measured in days represented from the first day of peace to the first
day when the conflict again passes the 25 battle-related deaths
threshold. This is a problem because there are many countries that
have several peace agreements signed before lasting peace occurs, so
the number of post-conflict societies as defined by this sample (200
in total) may be exaggerated. This potential problem could be solved
by controlling for conflict proneness.
Conclusions: Bridging the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide?
This growing quantitative literature has been met with significant
criticism. Two challenges we have discussed, the measurement
Lie et al, “Post-Conflict Justice.”
Meernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”
80 Melander, “Justice or Peace?”
78
79
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problem and modeling causal relationships, are frequently pointed
out. More generally, critics charge, quantitative studies fail to account
for the unique nature of each country’s TJ experience. As one set of
critics argue, large-N cross-national time-series studies fail to account
for “changes in the [global] normative context” over time and for
“local contextual factors.” 81 Some quantitative studies do seek to
control for world-historical context and we have discussed some
attempts to account for local context. Nonetheless, cross-national
studies necessarily sacrifice detail for generalizability. Quantitative
studies may be attributing causality to formal TJ processes in part
because they cannot hope to control for all local factors.
Ben-Josef Hirsch et al. 82 charge that large-N studies are
inherently biased by “presuming or predetermining the goals” of TJ.
It is the case that quantitative research has selected dependent
variables that are measurable through existing datasets. Not only
might it be difficult to construct a convincing causal argument for a
relationship, but these measures reflect an implicitly Western
conception of rights and justice that neglects deeper structural,
socioeconomic issues. Yet, in their critique, critics seem to sometimes
confuse goals, or measuring success, with measuring impact, which
could be considered distinct. Success relates to TJ mechanisms
achieving the goals set out for them by their creators, whereas impact
refers to the political, social, economic, and psychological effects of
TJ processes. 83 Quantitative studies have generally tested cause-effect
claims about various TJ mechanisms and a variety of areas of impact
that have been asserted for years. More generally, while
acknowledging these challenges, we reject the claim that quantitative
methodologies are worthless for understanding the impact of TJ.

Ben-Josef Hirsch et al., “Measuring the Impacts of Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions,” 395-396.
82 Ben-Josef Hirsh et al., “Measuring the Impact of Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions,” 398.
83 Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth,” 17-19.
81
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Frankly, the field as a whole benefits from a mixed methods
research program. 84 Quantitative approaches are well-suited to
aggregating large amounts of data and parsing out patterns of
behavior over time and space. Qualitative research, by contrast,
provides us with intimate case details that allow for the identification
and tracing of causal processes. As such, qualitative and quantitative
methods are actually quite complementary. Together, both
approaches are important in advancing knowledge and putting TJ
policy on more sound footing. Based on our survey of the
quantitative literature, we offer a few recommendations for future TJ
research.
A first issue relates to the scope of these findings. As we have
seen, studies have drawn their samples in different ways to examine
different types of transitional periods. This is appropriate, but
researchers and consumers need to be cautious of overgeneralizing
about what the findings mean in policy terms. This speaks, in part, to
broader debates in the field about whether the term TJ, which
emerged to characterize transitions from authoritarian rule, is
applicable to transitions from war to peace. One benefit of
quantitative methods is that variation in transition is something for
which we can control to explore how much (or how little) these cases
have in common.
Second, the question of the causal mechanisms through
which TJ effects outcomes needs further exploration. To focus
specifically on human rights, while Kim and Sikkink 85 argue that
human rights prosecutions lower levels of repression through
deterrence and norm diffusion, future research needs to empirically
determine whether or not this is the case. Doing so will help to
answer important sampling dilemmas, such as whether trials should
only be coded if a verdict is reached86 or if the entire process
including indictments, arrests, trials, etc. should be coded. Likewise,
P. Pham and P. Vinck, “Empirical Research and the Development and
Assessment of Transitional Justice Mechanisms,” International Journal of Transitional
Justice 1..2 (2007): 234-235.
85 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect.”
86 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
84
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future empirical research into the role that truth commissions play in
norm diffusion can help to determine which sampling strategies are
best in regards to whether only those truth commissions that hold
public hearings or that see their reports publicly released should be
coded, or if all truth commissions that begin their work should be
coded. However, as Mendeloff notes, the concept of norm diffusion
is difficult to empirically examine and may require great
methodological sophistication. 87 We lack adequate cross-national
measures to distinguish the two causal mechanisms so progress will
likely need to come through qualitative research.
One prominent way through which norm diffusion
potentially occurs is through the efforts of external actors. As such,
their role in post-conflict and transitional societies may serve as a
valuable predictor for which types of TJ mechanisms are employed.
This speaks to the issue of selection effects. Recent literature has
made some headway in regards to figuring out why states choose the
TJ measures that they do. This new research paradigm is important
for understanding the normative implications of TJ, because if certain
post-conflict scenarios (such as the involvement of the United
Nations) create conditions that are riper for (particular types of) TJ,
these measures may play a critical role in the emergence of postconflict human rights norms. For example, the involvement of nongovernmental and inter-governmental organizations is a significant
predictor of whether TJ measures are implemented in post-conflict
societies. 88 Interestingly, the involvement of the United Nations in
post-conflict societies is significant for predicting the implementation
of human rights prosecutions, truth commissions, amnesty and other
TJ measures. This is significant, because the presence of international
organizations in post-conflict societies may help establish norms that
emphasize accountability for human rights abuses. While this is
speculation, it is important to note that better understanding of the
normative implications of TJ may require treating the emergence of
Mendeloff, “Deterrence, Norm Socialization.”
Dawn L. Rothe and Scott Maggard, “Factors that Impede or Facilitate PostConflict Justice Mechanisms?” International Criminal Law Review 12.2 (2012): 193217; Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance, 79-96.
87
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TJ as the dependent variable because there are certain variables that
increase the likelihood of TJ processes being created. As such, the
quantitative studies that seek to control for antecedent conditions in
an attempt to isolate causality on the part of TJ are on the right track.
However, as Olsen et al. note, future research needs to uncover the
precise role that external involvement plays in influencing which TJ
mechanisms are employed. A mixed-methods approach may be most
useful for understanding this complex process.
Third, research should address the role of timing and
sequencing of TJ mechanisms. Many studies treat individual TJ
mechanisms in isolation. Yet, states frequently employ multiple
mechanisms, whether simultaneously or in sequence. Quantitative
studies haven’t effectively dealt with this. Interaction terms have
rarely been used, but would allow the researcher to examine the
cumulative effects when more than one mechanism has been utilized.
Timing and sequencing is a more difficult modeling challenge. TJ
mechanisms may or may not be implemented when political
transitions occur, but quantitative studies typically implicitly assume
that they are. Moreover, TJ mechanisms may be implemented in
different orders in different countries. This order likely matters for
their individual and collective impact, but quantitative studies have
not adequately dealt with this.
Finally, further research should focus on specific elements of
TJ processes. Future research on human rights prosecutions should
measure the impact of specific elements of the prosecution process
on the dependent variable, for example. Meernik 89 is a good starting
point in this line of research, as he measures the impact of certain
elements of ICTY trial processes (captures, surrenders, transfers to
The Hague, and judgments) involving key figures in the Bosnian
conflict (Slobodan Milosevic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Biljana Plavsic,
Rahim Ademi, Sefer Halilovic, Naser Oric, Tihomir Blaskic, Dario
Kordic and Mario Cerkez) on societal peace in Bosnia. While his
measures on the dependent variable are limited to Bosnia, his
James Meernik, “Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal
Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia,” Journal of Peace Research 42.3 (2005): 271-289.
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methodological approach may be utilized elsewhere and, with the loss
of some qualitative information, even be applied cross-nationally.
Such an approach would enable the quantitative literature to move
away from treating TJ as a dichotomous variable. A similar approach
could be taken to explore key elements of other TJ processes, such as
truth commission public hearings or the expiration of amnesty offers.
Through such efforts, future research could better understand the
impact of specific elements of TJ processes on variables such as
human rights.
The second wave of quantitative research has the potential to
move the field in this direction. The newly released Transitional
Justice Research Collaborative and Justice Data Project are marked
advances over the early datasets. 90 Both include more qualitative data
on TJ processes to enable researchers to make their own theoretical
judgments about how to account for TJ variation in their
measurement and sampling choices. Ultimately, this could provide
important policy recommendations by speaking to specific design
elements of TJ processes.
Appendix 1: Variation in Human Rights Trial Data
Country
Afghanistan
Albania
Argentina
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cambodia
90

Kim and
Sikkink 2010

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Olsen et al.
2010
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

See https://transitionaljusticedata.com/ and http://www.justice-data.com/.
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Chad
Chile
DRC
Republic of the Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Czechoslovakia
Czech Rep
East Tim
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
France
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Italy

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
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Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico
Morocco
Myanmar
Namibia
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
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Russia
Rwanda
Senegal
Serbia and Montenegro
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sudan
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Uruguay
United Kingdom
United States
Uzbekistan
Zambia

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
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Kim and Sikkink 2010

x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x

Olsen et al. 2010

Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010

x
x

Hayner 2001

Cases*
Pakistan
Uganda 1974
Zambia 1975
India
Bolivia
Argentina
Kenya
Honduras
Uruguay 1985
Zimbabwe
Philippines
Uganda 1986
Ghana 1989
Chile 1990
Czech Republic
Nepal
South Africa 1990
Chad
Lithuania 1991
South Africa 1991
El Salvador
Germany

Freeman 2006

Appendix 2: Variation in Truth Commission Cases
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Zambia 1993
Sri Lanka 1994
Sudan
Brazil
Burundi 1995
Haiti
Mexico 1995
South Africa 1995
Ecuador 1996
Guatemala
Sweden
Burkina Faso
Lithuania 1998
Indonesia
Nigeria
Rwanda 1999
Rwanda 1999-2000
Lebanon 2000
Malaysia
Poland
South Korea 2000-2
South Korea 2000-4
Uruguay 2000
Grenada
Jamaica
Lebanon 2001
Mexico 2001
Panama
Peru
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Zambia 2001
East Timor
Ghana 2002
Serbia and

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
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Montenegro
Sierra Leone
CAR
Chile 2003
Paraguay
DRC
Lebanon 2004
Morocco
Colombia
Indonesia 2005
Indonesia-East
Timor
Lebanon 2005
Liberia 2005
Bosnia
Sri Lanka 2006

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x
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Appendix 3: Variation in Post-Civil War States
Country
Afghanistan
Angola
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Bosnia
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Republic of Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Democratic Republic of Congo
Djibouti
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Georgia
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti

Meernik
et al.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Kim &
Sikkink
x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x
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India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Kenya
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Macedonia
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico
Moldova
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Russia

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
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Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia and Montenegro
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Syria
Tajikistan
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Yemen Arab Republic
Yemen People's Republic
Zaire
Zimbabwe

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
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